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Abstract 
 
When making economic choices, such as those between goods or gambles, humans act as if 
their internal representation of the value and probability of a prospect is distorted away from 
its true value. These distortions give rise to decisions which apparently fail to maximise reward, 
and preferences that reverse without reason. Why would humans have evolved to encode 
value and probability in a distorted fashion, in the face of selective pressure for reward-
maximising choices? Here, we show that under the simple assumption that humans make 
decisions with finite computational precision – in other words, that decisions are irreducibly 
corrupted by noise – the distortions of value and probability displayed by humans are 
approximately optimal in that they maximise reward and minimise uncertainty. In two 
empirical studies, we manipulate factors that change the reward-maximising form of 
distortion, and find that in each case, humans adapt optimally to the manipulation. This work 





Utility theories describe how economic choices are made under risk (1). The expected utility of 
a risky prospect is a function of its value 𝑥 and probability 𝑝 (2). Utility functions characterise 
the potentially nonlinear transformations that 𝑥 and 𝑝 undergo when humans make economic 
choices, such as deciding among monetary gambles. For example, the subjective expected 
utility 𝑈𝑖 of gamble 𝑖 offering monetary amount 𝑥𝑖  with probability 𝑝𝑖 might be described by 
the function 
 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑣(𝑥𝑖) ∙ 𝑤(𝑝𝑖) 
            [1] 
 
where 𝑣(𝑥) and 𝑤(𝑝) are psychometric transduction functions. Faced with uncertain 
prospects, human participants will often make choices that fail to maximise expected value (2, 
3). For example, many people will prefer $3000 with certainty over an 80% chance of winning 
$4000, even though the uncertain sum has higher expected value. Human preferences also 
tend to reverse irrationally with irrelevant factors. For example, an agent who prefers the 
certain sum above might well opt for a 0.2 chance of $4000 over a 0.25 chance of $3000 – 
even though this gamble is identical except for a rescaling of the probabilities by a factor of 
1/4. Utility theories typically propose variants of 𝑣(𝑥) and 𝑤(𝑝) that can capture violations of 
rationality such as this, allowing researchers to build predictive models of human economic 
choice (4). However, the resulting models describe rather than explain the policies that humans 
adopt when making risky decisions. Here, instead, we seek a normative account of the 
idiosyncratic forms of the empirically measured functions 𝑣(𝑥) and 𝑤(𝑝), under the 
assumption that human decisions are corrupted by irreducible noise in neural computation (5–
7). 
 
While the precise form of 𝑣(𝑥) and 𝑤(𝑝) that best capture human choices remains 
controversial, there is consensus over several points. Firstly, 𝑣(𝑥) is a compressive 
nonlinearity, such as a (sign-conserving) power law function, that inflects around zero, or the 
status quo wealth. For example, it is often assumed that 
 
𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑥𝜅 
[2] 
 
in the domain of gains. A number of different forms of 𝑤(𝑝) have been proposed, which mostly 
assert that the probability function approximates an inverse s-shape, i.e. is largely convex but 
with an initial concavity, often up to a fixed point around 𝑝~0.3. For example, one popular 
model that conforms to these requirements proposes that  
 





     
         
[3] 
where typically 𝛾 is empirically found to be on the order of 0.6-0.8 (8–10). 
 
Our goal here is not to debate the empirical form of 𝑣(𝑥) and 𝑤(𝑝). Instead, we ask a different 
question, which pertains to the processing limits of cognitive function, and consequently to 
the intrinsic variability of human choices. Assuming Gaussian noise in the internal 
representation of decision information, the probability of choosing gamble 1 over 2 is 
 
𝑞(𝑔1) =  Φ[𝑈1 − 𝑈2] 
            [4] 
 
where Φ[∙] is a logistic function with inverse slope 𝜎. The parameter 𝜎 scales with the inverse 
computational precision of human choices: decisions made under higher values of 𝜎 are more 
prone to error. In standard econometric accounts, 𝜎 is treated as a nuisance; it simply allows 
for random normal variability in decisions, consistent with the ubiquitously observed ogival 
form of psychometric functions. We similarly assume here that 𝜎 is an inevitable feature of our 
psychological apparatus, defined as an irreducible “late” noise term or bound on the precision 
of information processing. We then ask a simple question: given a fixed processing capacity 
which constrains 𝜎, what is the reward-maximising form of 𝑣(𝑥) and 𝑤(𝑝)? We address this 
optimisation problem, and in doing so, attempt to derive the minimal assumptions it is 
necessary to make about the quantity that humans are seeking to optimise during economic 
choices, in order for the canonically described form(s) of the functions 𝑣(𝑥) and 𝑤(𝑝) to be 




Consider an agent choosing among a pair of lotteries. Each lottery [𝑥𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖] involves an 
opportunity to obtain a monetary sum 𝑥𝑖  with probability 𝑝𝑖, or otherwise nothing. We denote 
the binary choice between two lotteries as [𝑥1, 𝑝1;  𝑥2, 𝑝2]. Next, we define a quantity 𝑌𝑖 that 
indicates the quality of each lottery with respect to an externally defined objective function, 
i.e. according to an assumption about what is “optimal” for humans. In the simplest case, we 
assume that this objective corresponds to the expected value of lottery 𝑖 so that 𝑌𝑖  = 𝐸𝑉𝑖 =
𝑥𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑖 and thus humans are simply wealth maximising. We highlight the difference between 𝑈 
and 𝑌: in our formulation 𝑈 is an internal psychological quantity that is calculated from 
distorted probability and magnitude of each lottery, whereas 𝑌 is defined externally and 
depends on our assumptions about what is optimal. 
 
The loss function over 𝑛 choices is computed as follows, where 𝑞(𝑔𝑖,𝑛) is the probability of 








𝑌1,𝑛 + 𝑞(𝑔2,𝑛) ∙ 𝑌2,𝑛 
            [5] 
 
Critically, we also assume that agents make decisions with finite precision; in other words, 
decisions are corrupted by irreducible Gaussian noise at the level of evaluation or choice. 
 
To begin with, we relax the assumptions that typify classical utility theories and treat this as an 
unconstrained optimisation problem. We assume a set of choices for which magnitudes 𝑥𝑖  (e.g. 
gamble outcomes in currency units) are drawn uniformly in the range [0,1] and probabilities  
𝑝𝑖 span the full range [0,1].  We define each of 𝑗 intervals into which 𝑥 and 𝑝 may fall, and 
estimate freely decision coefficients 𝑐𝑗
𝑥 and 𝑐𝑗
𝑝 for each interval (here, 𝑗 = 10) that minimise 
the loss term in eq. 4. We solve the optimisation problem separately for different values of 𝜎 
∈ [0: 0.02: 0.1] (see methods). The resulting coefficients 𝑐𝑗
𝑥 (upper panels) and 𝑐𝑗
𝑝 (lower 













Fig. 1. A. Optimal (i.e. reward-maximising) values for 𝑣(𝑥) and 𝑤(𝑝) as derived from eq. 4 under the 
assumption that 𝑌𝑖  = 𝑥𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑖 (y-axis) plotted against their untransformed counterparts (x-axis) 
under variable levels of decision noise (columns). B. Illustration of the effect of compression (in 
terms of power law distortion with exponent kappa (k)) on decisions. Top panels: under 𝜅 = 1, the 
decision variable (DV) reflecting the relative utility of the lotteries is a linear function of differences 
in 𝑥.  Lower panels: under 𝜅 = 0.5, smaller values of the decision variable are inflated away from 
zero, rendering these choices more robust to noise. C. Correspondingly, the distribution of decision 
values for the reward-maximising parameterisation under the double exponent model (black line) 
is broader than under no distortion (grey line). D. Probability that 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑈1 − 𝑈2) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑌1 − 𝑌2) 
for different values of log (𝜅) and log (𝛾) under the double-exponent model.  E. Absolute decision 
values, i.e. relative expected value |𝑈1 − 𝑈2| for different values of log (𝜅) and log (𝛾) under the 
double-exponent model. In B and C, the black circle indicates the reward-maximising values of 
log (𝜅) and log(𝛾).   
 
We highlight several features of these data. Firstly, in the case where 𝜎 = 0 (leftmost panel of 
Fig. 1a) the reward-maximising policy is to recover parameters 𝑐𝑗
𝑥 and 𝑐𝑗
𝑝 that are identical to 
their untransformed counterparts 𝑥𝑗 and 𝑝𝑗. This simply means that in the absence of decision 
noise, expected value can trivially be maximised by multiplying 𝑥 and 𝑝. More interestingly, 
however, when we assume finite computational precision (𝜎 > 0) then the policy that 
maximises expected value is distorted away from the identity line. In fact, both the reward-
maximising value function 𝑣(𝑥) and weighting function 𝑤(𝑝) take the form of a compressive 
nonlinearity (akin to a power function with exponent 𝜅 < 1 ), such that an optimal observer 
will magnify differences between lower magnitudes and between lower probabilities, relative 
to their higher counterparts. Thus, a compressive non-linearity of the form presented in eq. 2 
provides a compact description of the optimal decision weights. To corroborate this claim, we 
repeated our simulations under the assumption of power-law transducer functions (eq. 2), 
again finding a compressive non-linearity that mimics the optimal agent behaviour identified 
in free-fitting.  
 
This might seem counterintuitive, but it follows naturally from a consideration of where a 
limited resource (e.g. selective attention, or neuronal firing rates) can best be allocated to 
maximise rewards. We illustrate in Fig. 1b-e. The decision variable on which a choice is based 
is jointly determined by the difference in the utility of the gambles, i.e. will depend on +𝑈1 and 
−𝑈2. A compressive value or probability function that distorts 𝑈 away from 𝑌 will increase the 
probability that the lottery with lower objective value will be mistakenly chosen, i.e. distortion 
increases the number of “sign-flipped” gambles where 𝑝[𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑈1 − 𝑈2) ≠ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑌1 − 𝑌2)]. 
Thus, in the absence of decision noise, linear transducers maximise reward. However, an 
auxiliary effect of the compressive function is to increase the spread of the decision variable 
𝑈1 − 𝑈2 around zero, including for the majority of cases where the decision sign is not flipped. 
This ensures that small decision values are inflated away from the indifference point, rendering 
them more robust to decision noise and less likely to result in suboptimal choices. Similar 
phenomena, including the compressive form of the reward-maximising transducer under 
“late” decision noise (11), have been reported elsewhere (7, 12). 
 
Whilst the imposition of a compressive nonlinearity has been a hallmark of the utility function 
𝑣(𝑥) since Bernoulli (13), the compressive form of the optimal probability weighting function 
shown in Fig.1 (lower panels) is rarely observed (although see the proposal in (14), and the 
empirical data recorded from rodents in (15) for exceptions). Instead, a more typical form for 
𝑤(𝑝) is an inverse s-shape with an inflection below the midpoint. However, the curves above 
were derived under the assumption that humans simply wish to maximise expected value. 
Whilst this is desirable, it is also sensible to minimise the uncertainty associated with a given 
choice. For example, by taking actions whose outcome is predictable in advance, it is possible 
to formulate plans for the future, and potentially to avoid deleterious negative outcomes that 
accrue from overly risky choices (16). We thus considered a scenario in which the observer 
evaluates gambles according to a different objective value 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑖 ∙ (1 − 𝐻𝑖) where the 
new term 𝐻𝑖 is the Shannon entropy of the lottery (with base e): 
 
𝐻𝑖 =  −𝑝𝑖 ∙ log(𝑝𝑖) − (1 − 𝑝𝑖) ∙ log (1 − 𝑝𝑖) 
            [6] 
 
Next, thus, we assume that human choices seek to maximise reward and minimise outcome 
uncertainty. Using this new approach, we recomputed the optimal functions in an 










As can be seen, under these assumptions we can recover (i) the compressive form of the value 
function for the domain of gains, (ii) the inverse-s shape of the probability weighting function, 
and (iii) the inflection around 𝑝~0.3.  These functions clearly resemble the canonical utility 
functions 𝑣(𝑥) and 𝑤(𝑝) (8, 17). To verify this contention, we used a model mimicry approach, 
fitting several classical utility models to these freely derived optimal functions. Under the 
reward-maximising objective 𝑌𝑖  = 𝑥𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑖 both 𝑤(𝑝) and 𝑣(𝑥) were well captured by a power 
law function with an exponent of less than one; whereas when risk minimisation was an 
additional concern, the functions were best described by classical forms of 𝑤(𝑝), such as that 
shown in eq.3 or that proposed by Prelec (18). Together, these simulations thus imply that (i) 
when decisions are made with finite computational precision, distorted utility functions are 
optimal; and (ii) if we assume that human participants seek to maximise reward and minimise 
entropy, then a distortion of the form predicted by classical utility theory is optimal. 
Fig. 2. A. Optimal (i.e. reward-maximising) values for 𝑣(𝑥) and 𝑤(𝑝) as derived from eq. 4 under the 
assumption that 𝑌𝑖  = 𝑥𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑖 ∙ (1 − 𝐻𝑖) (y-axis) plotted against their untransformed counterparts 
(x-axis) under variable levels of decision noise (columns). B. Exceedance probabilities for the 
Prospect Theory model and double-exponent model in the certain outcome condition (left panel) 
and uncertain outcome condition (right panel). 
 
 
However, these considerations also allow us to make new predictions about human behaviour. 
Near-optimal probability weighting functions differ according to whether the agent is 
maximising reward only, or whether she is additionally minimizing uncertainty. Thus, when 
choices carry no risk, we should expect human behaviour to more closely resemble a model 
where both value and probability are compressive. In the following we will term this the 
“double exponent model”. By contrast, when choices carry risk, we should expect behaviour 
to resemble that of classical models, where 𝑤(𝑝) follows an inverse s-shape – we term this the 
“Prospect Theory” model. Thus, we should expect the form of the probability weighting 
function to vary according to whether outcomes are risky or not, whereas the value function 
should not be affected by this manipulation.  
 
We tested this prediction in two cohorts of human participants (n = 200 total) who made 
incentive-compatible decisions about financial lotteries (in the domain of gains) of the form 
[𝑥1, 𝑝1;  𝑥2, 𝑝2]. In each of two experiments, one group received the chosen gamble value 𝑥𝑐 
with probability 𝑝𝑐 and zero with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑐  (uncertain outcome condition, n = 99) the 
other group always received the expected value of the chosen gamble 𝑥𝑐 ∙ 𝑝𝑐  (certain outcome 
condition, n = 101). Experiments 1 and 2 were identical except that on each trial in Exp.1, 𝑥 
and 𝑝 were drawn randomly for each gamble, whereas in Exp.2 the probability of one of the 
gambles (e.g. 𝑝2 but not 𝑝1) was set to certainty but the expected values were otherwise 
matched to Exp.1 (see methods). Our model predicts that 𝑤(𝑝) and 𝑣(𝑥) will both be captured 
by power law functions (the “double-exponent model”) in the certain outcome condition, but 
by classical utility theory in the uncertain outcome condition, even though the expected value 
of every gamble is matched between certain and uncertain outcome groups. This is exactly 
what we found (Fig. 2b). Using Bayesian model selection (19) on cross-validated model fits to 
compare model fits of double-exponent and Prospect Theory (PT) models to human data, we 
found that the former fit the data best in the certain outcome condition (exceedance 














We conducted our next analysis under the assumption that the double-exponent and Prospect 
theory (PT) models provided a good reduction of the human policy in the certain outcome 
condition and uncertain outcome conditions respectively. Both models assume that 𝑣(𝑥) =
𝑥𝜅 (in the domain of gains explored here) but make different assumptions about 𝑤(𝑝): the 
double exponent model assumes that 𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑝𝛾 whereas PT assumes the probability 
weighting function shown in eq.2. This allowed us to plot the (negative) loss landscape −ℒ 
under each parameterisation (defined by 𝜅 and 𝛾) for a theoretical agent exhibiting the mean 
level of decision noise estimated across the cohort (Fig. 3) and to compare it to the best-fitting 
parameters for human participants. The surfaces for the certain outcome condition (Fig. 3a-b) 
confirm that the reward-maximising policy for an agent with the same average noise as our 
participants is to transduce 𝑥 and 𝑝 with compressive functions, so that the highest return is 
obtained for log(𝜅) < 0 and log(𝛾) < 0 (warm colour shading; black circle is the maximum 
given human levels of noise). For the uncertain outcome conditions (Fig 3c-d), the optimal 
value of log (𝜅) was always negative but the optimal value of 𝛾 varied with experiment: for 
Exp.1, rewards are maximised with log(𝛾) < 0 but for Exp.2, log(𝛾) > 0 is optimal (note that 
in the case of the uncertain outcome condition we use the term “optimal” to refer to those 
solutions that jointly maximise reward and minimise risk, as proposed above). This pattern of 
predictions closely resembles what was observed from human participants. In each case, the 
human parameters (red circles in Fig.3) fall in the area that minimises the relevant objective 
function. Moreover, as can be seen in the lower panels, the human parameters were those for 
which the expected return from distorted transducers exceeds the expected return from a 
linear transducer to the greatest extent. 
 
These intuitions were confirmed by statistical comparison. Parameters log (𝜅) fell reliably 
below zero in both conditions of both experiments (Exp 1 Certain Outcome: t = 12.5; Exp 2 
Certain Outcome: t = 8.41; Exp 1 Uncertain Outcome: t = 7.17; Exp 2 Uncertain Outcome: t = 
3.87; all p-values < 0.001).  Parameters log (𝛾) fell reliably below zero in both Certain Outcome 
conditions (Exp 1: t = 11.6; Exp 2: t = 6.67; both p-values < 0.001). However, in the Uncertain 
Outcome condition log (𝛾) was significantly below zero in Exp 1 (t = 4.2, p < 0.001) and above 
zero in Exp2 (t = 2.46, p < 0.02). These results are consistent with model predictions in each of 
the cases tested.  
 
Fig. 3. Upper panels: Loss landscapes showing parameterisations of the winning model in each group 
that maximise reward (for the certain outcome condition; panels A [Exp.1] and B [Exp.2]) and that 
maximise reward/minimise risk (for the uncertain outcome condition; panels C [Exp.1] and D 
[Exp.2]). Warmer colours signal parameterisations that are closer to optimal, and the black circle 
shows the maximum. Red circles show parameter estimates for individual human participants in 
each experiment (panel A-B: double exponent model; panel C-D: PT model). Note how humans 
cluster in the same quadrant as the maximum; see statistics below. Lower panels: the difference in 
loss between the distorted model and a linear model, i.e. a model with the same estimated noise 
but with log(𝜅) = 0 and log(𝛾) = 0. Red circles are individual participants.  Warmer colours show 





A further comparison of the human and reward-maximising value and probability functions is 
shown in Fig.4.  Here, we use the unconstrained model to freely estimate the reward-
maximising coefficients for each participant individually. The optimal coefficients vary across 
the cohort as individuals differ in their levels of estimated internal noise, and in the sample of 
Fig. 4.  Each panel shows the 
reward-maximising form of the 
functions 𝑣(𝑥) (blue shading) 
and 𝑤(𝑝) (red shading). Each 
function is expressed as a 
density over optimal estimates 
derived from each participant 
in the certain outcome 
condition (A [Exp.1] and B 
[Exp.2]) and the uncertain 
outcome condition (C [Exp.1] 
and D [Exp.2]). Optimal 
estimates vary from 
participant to participant 
because of distinct noise levels 
and variation in lottery 
sampling. Superimposed on 
each reward-maximising 
function is the form of the 
distortion that best fit human 
choices (estimated from 
median. parameters, shown on 
each plot). This was estimated 
from the double-exponent 
model for the certain outcome 
condition (A and B) and from 
Prospect Theory for the 
uncertain outcome condition 
(C and D).  
 
 
lotteries they viewed.  We plot the distribution of coefficients obtained across the cohort for 
𝑣(𝑥) [blue shading] and 𝑤(𝑝) [red shading] and superimpose on top the best-fitting value and 
probability functions from the double exponent model (certain outcome condition) and 
Prospect Theory (uncertain outcome condition). As can be seen, human distortions resemble 
the optimal solution qualitatively in each case tested, although they are slightly weaker than 
optimal in the uncertain outcome condition. 
 
The thesis advanced here is that distortions in the subjective representation of value and 
probability are reward-maximising. Our theory thus makes predictions about the relationships 
among observed parameters themselves, and how they relate to performance. Firstly, because 
the theory predicts that distortions have a common origin in reward-maximisation (at least in 
the certain outcome condition), the parameters 𝜅 and 𝛾 should be correlated: those 
participants with greater distortion for value should also have greater distortion for probability. 
Empirically, this is what we found in the certain outcome condition (both r-values > 0.3, both 
p-values < 0.001) but not the uncertain outcome condition (both p-values > 0.1). This follows 
from the assumption that in the uncertain outcome condition 𝜅 controls compression of value 
in the service of reward maximisation, whereas 𝛾 largely reflects risk sensitivity by controlling 




The nature of the internal representations that guide economic choices has been a question 
of longstanding interest for psychologists, economists and neuroscientists.  Here, we shed new 
light on this question by taking a normative rather than a descriptive perspective. We asked 
why humans behave as if they distorted estimates of probability and magnitude when making 
economic decisions. We suggest that they do so because in the presence of decision noise, 
distorted functions yield higher reward (and sometimes lower risk) than undistorted functions. 
Moreover, we show that the precise form of the distortions commonly observed in economic 
choice tasks (e.g. where humans make binary choices among lotteries) can be explained under 
three simple and uncontroversial assumptions: (i) human decisions are made with finite 
computational precision; (ii) humans wish to maximise expected value; (iii) humans wish to 
minimise risk (or outcome variance). Our empirical work shows that this account explains the 
effects of switching between otherwise equivalent safe and risky outcomes and can even 
explain a reversal in the shape of the probability weighting function that occurs when one sum 
is offered with certainty (Exp 2) or not (Exp 1).  
 
We note that our explanations for the form of the utility functions differ sharply from those 
proposed previously. A common view is that decisions are irrational because observers have a 
preference for “fast and frugal” computation, i.e. they are willing to sacrifice accuracy for 
speed when evaluating decision-relevant information (20). With regard to the value function, 
a compressive nonlinearity has typically been interpreted as implying an aversion to risk, 
because it accounts for the oft-observed preference for lottery [𝑥, 1] over [
𝑥
𝑘
, 𝑘] where 𝑘 < 1, 
i.e. the preference for certainty equivalents that are matched to the expected value of a risky 
gamble. We suggest, instead, that the compressive form of the transducer is simply a means 
to maximise return in the face of decision noise: by subjectively inflating smaller magnitudes 
and probabilities of reward, it renders otherwise uncertain choices less susceptible to decision 
noise, as long as that noise is distributed in an approximately Gaussian fashion. 
 
Our assumptions about the “canonical” form of the human utility functions draws principally 
on Prospect Theory. This is not meant to imply a commitment to the specific form of 𝑤(𝑝) 
proposed by eq.2. In fact, very similar results are obtained with the two-parameter forms of 
the probability weighting function described elsewhere (21). However, we found that the extra 
flexibility permitted by these functions did not improve the cross-validated model fit to human 
data, and so we chose to focus on the canonical function proposed by Prospect Theory.  
Moreover, the focus of our paper is on distortions of probability and value in the domain of 
gains. Whilst an identical argument would explain the mirror-symmetric compressive form of 
the value function in the domain of losses, the theory proposed here does not explain why 
losses “loom larger” than gains, having disproportionate influence on choices and further 
contributing to participants’ failure to maximise expected value (although see recent review 
articles that question the extent or replicability of loss aversion (22, 23)). Nor does our theory 
consider the most distinctive contribution of Prospect Theory – the intuition that computation 
of value is reference-dependent, with all utilities evaluated relative to a status quo given by 
the current context. The normative properties of such reference-dependence, for example in 





BS conceived of the project idea, JB, BS, and CS conceived of the simulation and experiment 
idea, JB and KJ collected the data, all authors carried out the stimulations, analysed the 










We obtained the optimal shape of the value and probability weighting functions under decision 
noise using a model-free approach. We first created all possible combinations of sets of two 
lotteries of the form [v,p; 0, 1-p] where p and v were drawn from one of j = 10 bins of equal 
size and spacing within the range [0.01,0.99]. These N = 10,000 samples were randomly split 
into training and test sets, after discarding trivial pairs where one lottery had both greater 
probability and value than its competitor. Next, we asked what decision weight an optimal 
agent should apply to each bin of value and probability in order to minimize one of two loss 
functions described below in the training set. Optimization was carried out via gradient descent 
using Matlab’s fmincon() function, with parameters for each bin initialised to 𝑥𝑗 and 𝑝𝑗. We 
varied the amount of noise in equation (4) by adjusting the parameter 𝜎 between 0 and 0.1 in 
intervals of 0.02, where higher values of 𝜎 indicate stronger noise, and repeated the simulation 
for each level of 𝜎. Having obtained the best fitting estimates we evaluated cross-validated fit 
on the held-out test set. For convenience and to allow direct comparison, values were scaled 
to fall within the interval (0, 1). Note, however, that the results of our simulations hold 





Ethical approval.  
All participants gave informed consent to participate in the study and were free to withdraw 
at any point. The study was approved by the ethics board of the Medical Sciences Division, 
University of Oxford (R50750/RE001)  
 
Participants 
We recruited n = 100 participants online for each of the two experiments on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). In experiment 1, 59 participants were male and 41 were female. In 
experiment 2, 62 were male, and 38 were female. Age was only assessed to decade resolution, 
with most participants falling within the 21 to 30 years range (74% in both experiments). 
Participants were remunerated for their time with $5 plus a bonus equivalent to the value of 
their chosen lottery of one randomly selected trial (scaled to $0-$10). We included only those 
participants whose performance differed significantly (p < 0.001) from random as determined 
by a binomial test (n = 167). 
 
Task 
Participants performed the task online in their browser and were required run it in full screen 
mode for the duration of the experiment. On each of the 250 trials, participants saw two 
lotteries to the left and right of the centre of the screen and were asked to indicate which of 
two lotteries they preferred. Participants were only instructed about the visual components of 
the task and that one lottery would be chosen at random at the end as their bonus, but 
received no further instructions about how to choose between the lotteries. During the 
response window of 20s, both lotteries remained on the screen until participants indicated 
their response using the left or right arrow key. A dial at the top of the screen indicated the 
time remaining within the trial. After participants pressed a button, the chosen lottery 
remained on screen for 1s and was then replaced with the outcome feedback for a further 2s. 
The next trial began immediately after this. Throughout the experiment, the time elapsed and 
trials completed were displayed at the top of the screen. Participants took on average 2.38s in 
experiment 1 and 2.03s in experiment 2 to respond, leading to a total average time for task 
completion of 23.6 minutes in experiment 1 and 21.5 minutes in experiment 2. There were no 
breaks during the experiment.  
 
Stimuli 
Lotteries consisted of one probability cue expressed as a percentage and one value cue 
expressed as dollar amount. This indicated that participants had the chance to win $X with Y% 
or $0 otherwise. For convenience, the shared $0 outcome across lotteries was not displayed 
on screen. Whether probabilities were displayed above values or vice versa was assigned 
randomly for each participant. Values and probabilities were sampled from a uniform 
distribution between $1-$99 and 1%-99, excluding trivial samples where one lottery was better 
on both value and probability than its competitor (these trivial gambles were also excluded 
from our simulations). Experiment 2 changed this to always include one certain lottery with 
100% probability, with the remaining probability and values sampled from the same uniform 
distribution and subject to the same constraint. In all experiments, participants completed 250 
trials and had to indicate their choice by pressing the left or right arrow key.  
 
Feedback 
Our main manipulation between groups pertained to how feedback was given to participants. 
The “certain outcome” condition received as feedback the product of value and probability, in 
other words the lottery’s expected value, whereas the “uncertain outcome” group received 
feedback depending on the lottery’s probability: either its dollar value (with probability p) or 
$0 (with probability 1-p). Note that the optimal strategy in the absence of noise is always to 
multiply the value and probability regardless of feedback. Hence, a noiseless ideal observer 




Similar to our simulations, we first assessed participants’ weighting functions using a model-
free approach. For this purpose, we again binned values and probabilities into j = 10 bins and 
fit one decision weight to each bin using the genetic algorithm. This allowed us to compute the 
density of decision weight estimates as illustrated in Figure 4, without having to assume a 
specific parameterized functional form.  We assessed how well economic decision-making 
models accounted for participants’ choices using maximum likelihood fitting. The two models 
we used were:  
First, a standard model from the Prospect Theory (PT) family of models of the form given in 
equations 2-3 of the main text.  
Second, we assumed that participants in the certain outcome group were better fit by a double 
exponent model as our simulations indicated no difference between the probability and value 
weighting functions for the return-maximizing agent. Thus, the double exponent model 
assumed both the v(x) and w(p) weighting to be of the form described in equation (2), albeit 
with different parameters: 𝜅 for v(x) and 𝛾 for w(p), employing the same naming convention 
as in equations (2-3).  
Models were fit to the data using a hierarchical model and optimized using the Expectation-
Maximization algorithm following software provided in (25). The model first draws a number 
of parameter samples from a group prior distribution and assesses fit for each sample. The 
group prior is then updated to better reflect those samples that more accurately predicted 
behaviour. These two processes proceed iteratively until convergence (i.e. no further 
improvement to fit is observed by adjusting the group prior or increasing the number of 
samples). We used the standard normal distribution as group priors. Data were fit separately 
for each group and experiment.  
 
Model comparison 
We compared models using the Variational Bayesian Analysis toolbox (26). We employed a 
random effect analysis, using the models’ log likelihoods to compute the exceedance 
probability that a given (crossvalidated) model fit participants’ data better than all other 
models. This procedure calculates the likelihood that a given model is more frequently the best 
model (across participants) compared to all others within the set. This produces a more 
nuanced model comparison metric than comparisons based on overall, fixed effects model fits 




Having established which of the two models best fit participants’ choices in each group and 
experiment, we asked whether the best fitting parameters fell within the range of optimal 
parameters for a given model. For this purpose, we plotted the loss landscape of each model 
over a range of parameter values, evaluating performance on the exact gambles given to 
participants. We fixed the noise in the simulation to the mean across participants and derived 
for each parameter pair [𝜅, 𝛾] how the model fared relative to a linear agent with parameters 
[1, 1]. As both models used power functions, we explored the parameters in log-space (with 
base e), where a value of 0 indicates a linear mapping from objective to subjective magnitude. 
We linearly sampled n = 50 points within the range of [−3, +3] in logspace and plotted the 
value of the loss function (either return-maximizing or entropic) at that point, Fig. 3.    
 
Data and code availability 
All data, and code to reproduce all figures and to run the simulations will be made freely 
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